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W
e live in a world that continues to be 
increasingly dependent upon petroleum. 
There are long distances between major petroleum 
sources and petroleum markets and large ocean-going 
vessels, known as tankers, carry this petroleum and its 
products. Tankers have increased in size and some are 
huge. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) weigh 
between 200,000 and 300,000 deadweight tons (dwt); 
ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs) can reach 500,000 
dwt. (ULCCs are about 50 times as large as World 
War Il-era "T-2" tankers.) Mostert said that tankers: 
"Are the biggest ships that have ever been, their 
dimensions being one of the technological audacities of 
the century. . . . They were the harbingers of that 
new manifestation of global strategy and national self- 
interest, the energy crisis. . . Petroleum tankers 
provide about one half of the carrying capacity of the 
world’s merchant fleet.2
The phrase "economies of scale" certainly applies to 
large tankers. However, from an environmental 
protection standpoint, another applicable phrase is 
"carrying all of one’s eggs in a single basket." If and 
when there is a spill incident involving a large tanker, 
the quantity of oil spilled is so great that it 
overwhelms whatever man-made or natural defenses 
there may be to protect the environment from damage.
In the United States, the public called for action 
following the grounding and spill of the Exxon Valdez 
in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Congress 
responded by passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA90).
Here is a summary of OPA90 as applied to the 
maritime industry. The law (1) required tankers in 
U.S. waters to have a Certificate of Financial 
Responsibility (COFR) with essentially unlimited 
liability; (2) required all new tankers be built with 
double-hulls, accompanied by a size and age phase-out 
of existing tankers beginning in 1995 and ending in 
2010; (3) mandated that the Coast Guard tie into the 
National Driver Register to detect drunk driving 
convictions; (4) increased Coast Guard authority to 
deny or revoke licenses and merchant mariners’ 
documents; (5) authorized the removal of incompetent 
masters; (6) increased the Coast Guard’s authority to 
deny entry to the United States of those foreign vessels 
with deficient manning standards; (7) limited work 
hours on tankers to 15 hours per day, but no more 
than 36 in any 72 hour period; and, (8) required the 
Coast Guard to designate areas where two licensed 
personnel are required to navigate a vessel, as well as 
where tug escorts are necessary.3
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The two requirements upon which this paper shall 
focus are the Certificates of Financial Responsibility, 
and double-hulls for tankers.
CERTIFICATES OF FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (COFR)
The COFR requirement for unlimited liability caused 
great concern within the tanker insurance industry, 
which consists of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) 
Clubs. These P&I Clubs were very reluctant to issue 
policy coverage when unlimited liability in involved. 
Previously, the responsible party was the ship owner 
and/or the cargo owner; the P&I Club protected them. 
OPA90 allows litigants to directly pursue the insurance 
company making all its assets vulnerable. Those 
traditional P&l Clubs initially refused to write 
coverage since it would expose them to direct lawsuits 
for unlimited liability.
The consensus was that only large companies like the 
major oil corporations will have adequate financial 
resources to comfortably acquire COFRs; "Few small 
tanker owners have been able to obtain their 
certificates of financial responsibility, but large tanker 
owners with substantial financial resources continue to 
find ways to certify their fleets."4 Recently, a handful 
of new companies have come into being hoping to 
make policies available that will meet the COFR 
requirements. INTERTANKO (the International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners) feels that: 
"No satisfactory solution to the question of Certificates 
of Financial Responsibility is available for the majority 
of tanker owners wanting to trade to the United 
States."5 The deadline for COFR coverage was 
December 28, 1994. In 1996 it was reported that all 
tankers operating in U.S. waters had met the COFR 
requirement, with 62 percent relying on insurance 
companies, 37 percent self-insuring or having bank 
guarantees, and one percent buying surety bonds.6
Ship brokers predicted that tankers backed by a COFR 
soon will command a premium in the charter markets. 
The COFR requirement has already impacted the U.S. 
oil trade with several small tanker firms withdrawing
from the U.S. market. Bishop thinks that COFRs will 
add an additional 2-5 cents/barrel to the cost of 
tankering and he added that U.S. refineries will 
continue to have trouble with increased air quality 
regulations which will foster even more changes in 
tanker market logistics."
Another concern to tanker owners, recently come to 
the fore, is the proposed regulations for Natural 
Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) as provided 
for under oil pollution laws passed in 1990. In their 
present form, the proposed regulations can add up to 
almost unlimited liability for tanker operators based on 
theoretical models. Because of the speculative nature 
of these projections, some protection and indemnity 
clubs may deny coverage for NRDA-related claims. 
Should that happen, tanker owners would be faced 
with a dilemma that could interrupt the flow of oil to 
the U. S. Computer models for assessing damage 
have been criticized. "In one case, a spill of 10 
gallons of heavy crude oil led to a computer-generated 
assessment of $1.28 million, or $128,000 ... per 
gallon spilled. The result assumed a mortality of 
400,000 birds per barrel spilled. ... In fact, the 
Exxon Valdez caused a mortality of approximately two 
birds per barrel."8
The International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) and its Enhanced Survey Program 
(ESP) is attempting to root out sub-standard tonnage 
in the tanker industry. This program comes largely as 
a result of an increase in tanker losses at the turn of 
the decade and the negative publicity directed against 
the 1ACS and its members as a result. The societies 
have been criticized for not being tough enough on 
ship owners and allowing a large number of unsafe 
vessels to continue in operation. Some companies are 
utilizing in-house vetting programs to assure quality 
tonnage for their business. Recently, the three largest 
I ACS members published their own ideas for marine 
safety. Without consulting other members, the 
American Bureau of Shipping, Det Norske Veritas, 
and Lloyd’s Register launched a plan "to strengthen 
their transfer rules so that no ship can switch from one
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to another until all outstanding repair requirements 
have been completed."9
Flag State Control, where the vessel’s country of 
registry acts as enforcing agent, has been the method 
for safety and environmental control to date. 
Enforcement, however, has been less that aggressive 
in many cases.
"Port State Control" is the new buzzword whereby the 
regulatory agency of the vessel’s current port acts to 
enforce flag state regulations and, as a minimum, the 
regulations of the port state. "Members of the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 
(MOU), which have a voluntary agreement to check 
the condition of a quarter of foreign-flag ships calling 
at their national ports each year, currently focus their 
inspections toward passenger ships, bulk carriers, and 
vessels registered in countries with a poor maritime 
safety record.'"0 This method has proven to be much 
more pro-active.
The U.S. is not signatory to the Paris MOU but the 
U.S. Coast Guard has been asked to implement a Port 
State Control system for the U.S. This system was 
initiated in 1994 and the Coast Guard is acting to 
implement and improve the system. The initial system 
had concentrated on vessel owners, operators, and flag 
states. Under the newer system, the Coast Guard’s 
data base will include the performance of vessel 
classification societies, since these societies 
presumably both review plans for vessel design and 
rebuilding, and inspect vessels to ensure compliance 
with safety standards. The Coast Guard utilizes United 
Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
guidelines to evaluate the work of classification 
societies, and the quality of work of the different 
classification societies varies. This information, along 
with records concerning the vessel’s owner, vessel 
history, cargo carried, and vessel age are entered into 
a matrix where scores are assigned. The scores 
determine a "Boarding Priority," meaning which 
vessels will be selected for inspection, should they 
enter U.S. waters.
DOUBLE-HULL TANKER 
CONSTRUCTION
Double-hull construction is when a second layer of 
metal separates the cargo tanks from the ocean; the 
space between the two layers being occupied by air 
when the cargo tanks are carrying oil, or water when 
in ballast (while cargo tanks are empty). As might be 
expected, double-hull construction takes more capital 
than single-hull due to increased design, material and 
labor requirements. Estimates for the increase in 
construction costs vary and can run as high as 20 
percent over a single-hulled vessel.11 In addition to 
construction costs, operating costs for double-hulls are 
also higher. Tank inspection and maintenance will just 
about double and the increased effort resulting from 
double-hull construction has been estimated as high as 
25 percent. For a small tanker spending 2 million 
dollars a year for inspection and maintenance, an 
additional $500,000 is necessary.
No new U.S.-flag double-hull vessels have been 
delivered since OPA90 although some are under 
construction and some existed previously; as 
examples, Marine Transport Lines operates the 
double-hulled Chemical Pioneer and Chevron Shipping 
operates a five-vessel class with double-hulls. On May 
17, 1996, Avondale Shipyards in New Orleans 
launched the first of four double-hulled tankers that 
were designed and constructed to comply with the 
double-hull requirements of OPA90.
The spill prevention theory behind double-hull 
construction is that upon grounding or collision, there 
is a void space to absorb the impact without allowing 
oil to escape. Any ruptured tanks are flooded with sea 
water and the ship rides deeper in the water. The risks 
associated with double-hull construction are centered 
around major hull breaches and explosions.
The very spill which fomented OPA90, the Exxon 
Valdez, is believed to have been less due to single-hull 
construction. If the vessel had been double-hulled, the 
majority of the ballast tanks would have been flooded 
and the increased weight would likely have exceeded
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the vessel’s inherent strength; the ship would have 
broken up and instead of 260,000 bbls, the spill could 
have been the entire cargo of approximately 1,000,000 
bbls. The primary concern within the industry with a 
major casualty is that many ballast tanks will be 
ruptured and the vessel will break apart, and one study 
"concluded that double bottom design is a detriment to 
a grounded vessel salvageability and therefore 
increases the chances of a major spill. Double bottoms 
may prevent minor pollution in vessel groundings, but 
probably increase the risk of major pollution in large 
vessel incidents."12
Another risk is the control of ballast tank atmosphere. 
Cargo tank vapor space (the space between the surface 
of the liquid and the top of the tank) is filled with inert 
gas to prevent any possibility of explosion. Ballast 
tanks are not inerted because they normally carry only 
water. The risk is when cargo enters the ballast tank 
and the vapor mixes with the air and forms an 
explosive mixture. The cargo may gain entry due to 
corrosion or cracks and if not detected, will endanger 
personnel attempting entry. Crew members may be 
overcome by the vapor or suffocate due to lack of 
oxygen, or an explosion may occur. Inerting ballast 
tanks adds significantly to construction costs. A final 
consideration relative to double-hull construction is the 
use of high tensile steel. This material allows the 
designer to meet the necessary construction and safety 
requirements with less metal. High tensile steel, 
however, corrodes at the same rate as "normal" steel 
and fatigue life is diminished. Using high tensile steel, 
as is becoming the norm, will require exceptional 
vigilance insofar as inspection and testing for rust, 
corrosion, and inherent material strength.
A separate issue with ballast is ballast water pollution. 
Ships use ballast water to maintain their sea­
worthiness; the various "bending" or "shear” forces 
felt by the vessel’s hull are brought to within design 
and safety limits by adding ballast weight at desired 
points within the hull. In the case of tankers, this 
weight is added for the empty leg of the voyage. 
Nearly all ocean-going vessels are built with the
capability for carrying ballast water, and this is taken 
on from the water wherever the vessel is floating, 
whether inside a harbor or at sea. When no longer 
needed, the water is pumped overboard, again 
wherever the vessel happens to be.
By using tanks designated for ballast water only, oil 
pollution is avoided. However, a new environmental 
problem arises and that is the transfer of marine life to 
an area where it may not be desired. There is some 
awareness of this issue. Chevron double-hull tankers, 
going from San Francisco Bay to the Gaviota Terminal 
near Santa Barbara, take on ballast in San Francisco 
Bay. Shortly after leaving the Bay, they discharge this 
ballast water and take on ocean water. This step 
minimizes the possible bad effects the San Francisco 
Bay water might cause.
Alternative designs, potentially equivalent to double­
hull, have not yet been acted on by the Coast Guard. 
Among these are the mid-deck tanker design (and two 
variations: the Coloumbi egg design, the POLMIS 
design) and the American Underpressure System. (The 
mid-deck tanker design has an additional deck installed 
approximately half way between the keel and the main 
deck, and below the loaded water line. Should a 
grounding or collision occur causing damage to the 
lower tanks, higher water pressure from outside the 
vessel will keep the oil in the tank. The American 
Underpressure System acts to create a partial vacuum 
in the vapor space above the cargo. By establishing 
and maintaining this vacuum after an incident, cargo 
is held inside the ship.) The Coast Guard is studying 
these designs.
The major advantage to double-hull construction is that 
the ballast tanks act to absorb the impact without 
allowing oil to escape. Almost everyone, industry and 
environmental alike, agree that this design will reduce 
the amount of oil spilled in minor situations involving 
limited hull breech. All of these scenarios have 
occurred and double-hull construction has prevented a 
spill.
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Current thinking is that the double-hull requirement 
will not spread to other countries. Vessels delivering 
oil from other countries to the U.S. will bring it to 
within about 100 miles of the U.S. shore in single-hull 
tankers. At that point out at sea it will be lightered 
(transferred at sea) to double-hull tankers that will 
deliver it to U.S. ports. In mid-1995, the U.S. Coast 
Guard was establishing areas for lightering in the Gulf 
of Mexico, "The Coast Guard said the zones are 
necessary because the tanker industry is not building 
double-hulled tankers fast enough . . . ,”13
U.S.-FLAG TANKERS
The Jones Act requires that cargo going from one 
U.S. port to another be carried on a U.S.-flag vessel. 
Under this act, many U.S.-flag tankers carry clean 
products (jet fuel, gasoline, diesel fuel, etc.) since 
crude oil is brought in on less expensive foreign flag 
vessels. (Currently, all Alaskan North Slope Crude Oil 
is brought to the U.S. on U.S.-flag tankers.) As more 
and more of the U.S.-flag tanker fleet is phased out 
under OPA90, freight rates for the remaining few will 
increase. Shipping companies will be reluctant to build 
new ships or convert old ones due to higher operating 
and construction costs for U.S. ships.
"It’s also thought that U.S. environmental regulations 
may force the Maritime Administration to grant 
exemptions to the Jones Act, giving business to 
foreign tanker owners."14 Representing the current 
change in the U.S. tanker market, this quote shows 
growing fear that while the fleet of tankers worldwide 
will continue to grow, the U.S.-flag tanker fleet will 
be reduced. A National Maritime Administration study 
indicated that sufficient Jones Act vessels would be 
available for 1995, but "shortages of product tankers 
and tank barges could develop in 1996."15
There will be increased controversy over subsidies to 
U.S.-flag ship owners. An example: "A $139 million 
federal loan guarantee to a U.S.-flag tanker company 
modernizing four aging vessels in a Louisiana shipyard 
is angering competitors and has reopened a debate 
over the Maritime Administration’s program of
extending financial support for the shipbuilding 
industry."16
There will also be continuing controversy over the 
amount of regulation being imposed on the shipping 
industry. Individual coastal states are also getting into 
the act by enacting their own specific regulations since 
the Exxon Valdez incident. The U.S. Coast Guard had 
to inform Washington State that some of that state’s 
proposed regulations were in topical areas where the 
Coast Guard claimed jurisdiction. California’s Office 
of Oil Spill Prevention and Response is requiring 
"escort" tugs to accompany single-hull oil tankers in 
San Francisco Bay. Each escorting tug costs an 
estimated $5,000. In June, 1995, Massachusetts 
environmental officials delayed implementation of a 
"clean air” rule requiring vapor recovery equipment 
on tankers. The rule would have applied to the 
Chelsea River, where Coast Guard requirements meant 
that tankers that had just discharged their cargo would 
have to take on ballast before moving down river. The 
taking on of ballast would have released vapors.18 
These are only examples of state actions, but they 
show that tanker operators have many new rules to 
read and to follow.
WORLDWIDE CONCERNS
After having looked at two specific new U.S. 
requirements, we can step back and try to see a bigger 
picture of where they fit in a global setting of what is 
truly a global industry. Worldwide demand for energy 
continues to grow. The world’s energy demand 
increased 6.7 percent between 1987 and 1992—a little 
over one percent per year). Growth rates are expected 
to return to about 1.5 percent to 1.7 percent per year 
for the rest of the decade due to the ending of the 
world-wide recession, the end of the demand slump in 
the former USSR countries, and continued rapid 
growth of emerging nations in South East Asia, Latin 
America and the People’s Republic of China. Oil is 
about 40 percent of energy demand (natural gas is 
about 23 percent). "The world’s major industrial 
consumers of energy are still structurally bound to 
depend primarily on oil and oil products as fuel
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sources, and the transfer to gas-fired boilers or ‘clean’ 
sources of electricity will necessarily occur only 
gradually."17
Worldwide, the major sources of petroleum are the 
Middle East and North Sea. They supply oil to the 
U.S., as does Venezuela. Another source of U.S. oil 
is the Alaskan North Slope, with oil moving from 
Valdez by tanker to U.S. ports on the either West 
Coast or East Coast (via a pipeline parallel to the 
Panama Canal).
Air pollution controls have impacted upon the refining 
industry. Historically crude has been transported to the 
end user markets due to refinery location, and 
refineries were built near major population centers to 
take advantage of skilled labor and technology. This 
scenario has been changing with producing countries 
building complete refineries near active fields. Burrill 
feels that the recent increase in regulation regarding 
air and water quality in the developed nations will tend 
to drive refineries to other countries. Major oil 
companies will build elsewhere and will essentially be 
"exporting air pollution"18 in order to remain 
competitive. A second reason for this is that the oil­
exporting nations wanted to create more jobs in their 
own economies. "Turn key” contracts have resulted in 
operating refineries in the Middle East and West 
Africa allowing these countries to pursue the export of 
refined products and to take advantage of the higher 
profit margin. Tankers that carry petroleum products 
are smaller than those that carry crude oil. Product 
buyers do not buy such large product cargoes and 
most ports do not have the capacity to handle large 
ships discharging products, or to store the refined 
material. The ramifications of environmental 
protection regulations can be complex since refined 
products are considered more hazardous than crude. 
For example, reformulated gasoline, blended with 
regular gasoline to reduce carbon monoxide produced 
by autos, is much more dangerous for tankers to 
carry. The reason is that some of its contents render 
ineffective the foam traditionally used to combat 
tanker shipboard fires.
Future oil production acts as a guideline for changes 
in tanker demand. The consensus appears to be that 
tanker tonnage will rise from approximately 207 
million deadweight tons (dwt) to around 240 million 
dwt by 2000 (a 16 percent increase). Most of the 
increase will be for long haul transits in 90,000 dwt 
vessels and up. Between 1996 and 2000, a 24 percent 
increase in crude tankering is expected, mainly in the 
long haul routes.19
Drewry Shipping Consultants forecast an average 
annual growth of two percent in tanker demand for the 
period 1994 to 2000.20 Long haul crude transport is 
expected to grow, with the emphasis on VLCCs. The 
growing South East Asia market, however, will 
demand larger amounts of product as economic 
development progresses.
Worldwide controls on the tanker industry come from 
the International Maritime Organization (1MO), which 
is an agency of the United Nations. Their initial thrust 
was safety at sea, but they now are concerned with 
pollution prevention as well. They also direct 
programs of international cooperation to deal with oil 
spills, wherever they occur. IMO cites figures that 
major oil spills have declined since 1980 and, in 
addition, less oil enters the water because of stricter 
maritime operational practices (such as tank cleaning) 
and equipment (segregated ballast tanks).21 Tanker 
firms and other members of the petroleum industry 
also support and participate in "response teams" that 
will go anywhere in the world to help combat an oil 
spill and reduce its damage. Firms operating in the 
U.S. must also have government-approved "spill- 
response" plans that include contractual commitments 
stating what equipment and personnel they can make 
available to combat a spill. The result has been that 
competitors agree to help each other in case of a spill 
by providing personnel and equipment, such as 
"skimmers," to be shared.22 Ship salvagers at the site 
of tanker accidents now have special training and 
equipment to reduce the leakage of oil from damaged 
hulls.
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INDUSTRY RESPONSE
In light of the Exxon Valdez 1989 grounding in Prince 
William Sound, U.S. regulations regarding crew size, 
crew rest, ship construction, oil spills, and spill 
response have grown. The new U.S. and state 
restrictions are sufficiently severe that some companies 
(Shell and BP) are not allowing their vessels to trade 
in U.S. waters. Others are considering similar action 
and some are distancing themselves from tankers 
altogether. Exxon has renamed its shipping company 
"SeaRiver" apparently in an attempt to remove the 
Exxon name from tankers; a far cry from the days 
when oil companies painted their name in large block 
letters along the mid-section of the hull. Major oil 
corporations will look to reducing liability by avoiding 
in-house shipping operations; they will be outsourcing 
their transportation business. Those remaining 
companies are increasing their efforts to assure quality 
ships are being used. Chevron, Exxon and others have 
a "vetting" process whereby each vessel to be used for 
their cargo or at their terminals is approved as being 
suitable. Vetting includes vessel trading history, 
comparing vessel size and mooring equipment to berth 
size and configuration, water depth limits versus 
vessel draft, safety equipment and general vessel 
condition. This emphasis on quality should result in an 
increasing premium being paid for modem tanker 
tonnage.
However, Clarkson Research Studies Limited feels 
"the oil industry will continue to rely on using low 
grade tankers for the foreseeable future.”23 Also, 
"Some of the world’s most safety-conscious oil 
companies with comprehensive ship-vetting procedures 
regularly charter elderly tankers. ”24 Clarkson envisions 
the continuation of a two tier system, at least in the 
VLCC market segment. "The trading pattern of high 
productivity vessels was skewed toward the OECD 
countries. In particular the quality of ships visiting 
North America was above average, suggesting that 
OPA90 is having the desired effect. Low productivity 
vessels are more prominent in the non-OECD 
countries."25
Captain Dennis Bryant, deputy director of the Coast 
Guard’s staff that is writing pollution act rules has said 
"Our analysis indicates there will be a tanker shortage 
.... We don’t see construction rates (of double-hull 
tankers) as adequate to meet the coming shortage."26
CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this paper was discussion of two 
specific new U.S. controls on the tanker industry 
mandated by OPA90: the double-hull tankers, and for 
almost unlimited liability protection. These are just 
two requirements from a long list.
There is disagreement as to the effectiveness of a 
tanker’s double-hull. Unfortunately, we may have to 
wait for an incident to determine how well they work. 
Possibly the next wreck will indicate some of the 
currently-mandated design’s shortcomings, and 
advisory circulars will be issued by a federal agency 
indicating what additional safeguards must be either 
retrofitted to existing vessels or included in new ones.
The insurance requirement may be of some help, 
although at a cost. Older vessels will avoid U.S. ports, 
and this in itself may help protect the nation’s shores, 
since older vessels are sometimes fatigued.
These requirements can be viewed in a worldwide 
perspective of the petroleum industry, and in a 
growing demand for environmental protection. One 
can ponder the extent to which national regulations 
reduce pollution or merely shift its incidence.
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